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REGULATING HOME EQUITY PROTECTION COMPANIES AND
CONTRACTS: ARE STATES MAKING “THE BEST” AN ENEMY OF
“THE GOOD?”
JOHN E. MARTHINSEN*
***
Residential homes are the largest, most leveraged assets in most U.S.
families’ portfolios. Home equity protection (HEP) contracts offer
opportunities to safeguard these real estate interests. In the United States,
each state decides if a HEP contract is financial guarantee insurance (FGI)
and, therefore, regulated by the state laws and insurance commission rules,
or non-insurance financial protection (NIFP), which may escape state and
federal regulations. Because HEP contracts have the potential to provide
substantial benefits to homeowners, their regulation should be designed to
protect state residents and encourage the development of safe alternatives.
This article explains HEP contracts, their development, and why states
should treat those that require material interests as FGI. Particular focus is
put on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of HEP contracts that are
linked to home price indices, (2) why linking these contracts to price indices
should not disqualify them as FGI, and (3) how HEP companies engage in
regulatory arbitrage by linking their policies to home price indices and
claiming NIFP status.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, U.S. household equity in real estate has grown more
than 12,600%, reaching approximately $12.4 trillion at the end of the third
quarter 2015.1 Despite the fact that individuals may face a greater likelihood
of their houses falling in value than suffering damage from fire, wind, hail,
* Professor of Economics and International Business and The Distinguished
Chair in Swiss Economics at Babson College.
1
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Households:
Owners Equity in Real Estate, Level, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/
OEHRENWBSHNO (accessed January 1, 2016).
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lightning, theft, or vandalism, the U.S. financial and insurance markets have
developed few practical ways for families to protect themselves against
declining real estate prices.2 Furthermore, where and when alternatives have
been offered, turnover has been rather weak – even when policies were
subsidized.
As their name implies, home equity protection (HEP) contracts
safeguard the non-debt value (i.e., equity) of residential homes, but their
particular forms can vary considerably. They could be written to safeguard
only homeowners’ initial down payments, but coverage could also be
broadened to include home improvements, mortgage amortization, and costof-living adjustments. HEP contracts could be offered only on primary
residences or made available for second, third, or investment homes.
Maturities could be long-term (e.g., 10-to-15 years), short-term, with the
expectation of rollovers every two-to-three years, or last as long as the
policyholder owns a protected home. Premiums might be up-front, lumpsum payments or monthly installments. When a protected home is sold, these
contracts could be assumable – or not. Contracts might restrict claims to
individuals who sell their homes at a loss and move certain distances away,
but they could just as easily allow claims at contract maturity or remove all
limitations so that claims can be made any time the contract is in-force.
Insurance is an elusive term, which explains why it is defined in
different ways by different states. In general, it (1) is a contract, (2) with
consideration secured by premiums that (3) pays or indemnifies the contract
owner for (4) fortuitous3 events that (5) cause financial loss. If a HEP
contract is classified as financial guaranty insurance (FGI), then it is
regulated by state laws and insurance commission regulations. By contrast,
if the contract is classified by a state as non-insurance financial protection
(NIFP), then it escapes that particular state’s regulations and possibly federal
regulations, as well.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
defines FGI as a contract that protects a policyholder from “changes in the
value of specific assets or commodities, financial or commodity indices, or

Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19(1) J. REAL
ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 21 (1999).
3
In this context, fortuitous means that claims and the events that trigger them
are independent and identically distributed (i.e., random), which implies they cannot
be accurately forecasted.
2
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price levels in general.” 4 Despite this guidance, each state can determine
whether a HEP company is engaged in the business of insurance and,
therefore, should be regulated as an FGI company.
In the past, FGI contracts focused mainly on protecting investors
from credit risks associated with interest-earning public securities, such as
municipal debt obligations, and private debt obligations, such as commercial
mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, automobile
loans, and student loans. Since the 1980s, many states have required FGI
companies to follow monoline rules, which have forced them to separate this
business from other insurance lines. Such partitioning was intended to isolate
FGI risks from other insurance lines so that contagion into or out of this
sector did not occur.
This article explains HEP contracts, their development, and why
states should treat those that require material interests as FGI. Particular
focus is put on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of HEP contracts that
are linked to home price indices, such as the S&P/Case-Schiller Index,
Federal Housing Finance Administration's Index, and CoreLogic Index, (2)
why linking these contracts to price indices should not disqualify them as
FGI, and (3) how HEP companies engage in regulatory arbitrage by linking
their policies to home price indices and claiming NIFP status.
II.

WHAT ARE HEP CONTRACTS?

HEP contracts offer policyholders practical ways to safeguard the
equity investments in their homes. If done correctly, these contracts can
improve capital market efficiency, lower borrowing costs, and provide
capital market access to borrowers with relatively low credit ratings. They
can also provide social benefits, such as increasing labor mobility (e.g.,
accepting jobs that require relocation and the sale of homes at losses).5 On
the negative side, HEP contracts may encourage individuals to increase debt
levels to unsustainable levels; discourage routine home maintenance
See Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’r, Definition of Insurance: Definition of Insurance
Working Group (Sept. 12, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.naic.org/
store/free/DOI-OP.pdf; see also, NAIC Financial Guaranty Insurance Guideline:
§ 1A (1) (e), http://www.naic.org/store/free/GDL-1626.pdf (accessed January 1,
2016) (emphasis added).
5
See Yulia Demyanyk, Dmytro Hryshko, María José Luengo-Prado, & Bent
Sorensen, Keeping the House or Moving for a Job, 9 FED. RES. BANK OF
CLEVELAND. ECON. COMMENTARY 1 (2013) (explaining doubts about this benefit).
4
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improvements, and repairs; and induce premature home sales in declining
markets, thereby accelerating systemic reductions in real estate prices.
Normally, HEP contracts have one-time costs (e.g., between 1.5%
and 3.0% of a home’s protected value),6 long-term maturities (e.g., 10 to 15
years, but they terminate when a home is sold), relatively short vesting
periods (e.g., 2 years), and maximum limits on claim payments (e.g., 25% of
the protected value). Other limitations often apply, such as deductibles and
denial of claims on foreclosed homes.
The vesting period has two major functions. First, it discourages
short-term, speculative gains by flipping homes (i.e., purchasing houses with
no intention to occupy, making minor improvements, and then quickly trying
to resell them at higher prices). Second, by delaying claim payments, vesting
reduces the ability to forecast changes in real estate prices, which (perhaps,
ironically) improves the ability to price option contracts.
A.

AN EXAMPLE OF HOW HEP CONTRACTS WORK

Consider a family that purchases a home for $100,000, with a
$90,000 mortgage loan and $10,000 down payment. To protect its equity
investment, the family purchases a HEP contract having a two-year vesting
period, 10-year maturity, and maximum payout of 25%. Exhibit 1 shows the
consequences if the home is sold after its value rises by 10%, stays the same,
or falls by 10%, 30%, and 40%. Notice that, during the two-year vesting
period, the contract pays no claims, regardless of the percentage decline in
the home’s sales price. Afterwards, a ceiling of $25,000 is imposed on claims
when the home’s selling price falls by 25% or more. Therefore, if the price
falls to $70,000, the payout cap is surpassed and claims remain at $25,000.
Similarly, a claim floor equal to $0 occurs when the home’s price stays the
same or rises. In between these limits, claim payments are linearly and
inversely related to the protected home’s current market value. Therefore, at
market prices of $90,000 and $80,000, these policies pay $10,000 and
$20,000, respectively. As Exhibit 1 shows, the wealth of a HEP contract
owner can rise, stay the same, fall, and even become negative, depending on
the direction and extent of home price movements. This point will be
important, later, in our discussion of indemnification.

6
Premium differences may be based on geographical location and individual
considerations.
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* Assets and claims are positive values. Liabilities are negative values. This example ignores mortgage amortization.
** Claims are limited to 25% of the protected value.

BRIEF HISTORY OF HEP CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES
B.
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The first U.S. experiment with HEP contracts was a Department of
Defense program for military personnel in the mid-1960s, followed by a
municipally sponsored program in Oak Park, Illinois during the mid-tolate1970s. Thereafter, in 2002, Yale University’s International Center for
Finance collaborated with the Syracuse Neighborhood Initiative in Syracuse
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N.Y. to create a non-profit HEP program, called Home HeadQuarters.7 Its
purpose was to reinvigorate home ownership in depressed Syracuse
neighborhoods. For the Oak Park experiment, claims were based on
transaction prices (i.e., purchase and sale prices), while claims for the
Syracuse experiment were based on changes in a price index. In 2011, Ohiobased EquityLock Solutions Inc. began offering HEP contracts that also
linked claims to changes in local price indices.
Until relatively recently, U.S. housing busts were mainly regional,
but the Great Recession (2007 – 2009) changed that, causing many to believe
that this severe and prolonged compression of real estate prices might pave
the way for tandem increases in the supply of and demand for innovative
HEP contracts. Greater demand was expected from: (1) homeowners,
seeking to safeguard the real estate values of their portfolios, (2) mortgage
lenders, seeking protection from worrisome loan-to-value ratios, (3)
investors, seeking synthetic real estate returns via futures and credit
instruments, (4) developers, seeking protection from declining real estate
values for projects under construction, (5) insurers, seeking hedges against
mortgage defaults, and (6) realtors, real estate brokers, mortgage brokers,
and home sellers, seeking ways to safeguard potential home buyers from
further real estate price erosion.
On the other side of the HEP market, greater contract supply was
expected from professional investors, seeking to increase their real estate
exposures via financial products, instead of investing in physical properties.
As well, insurance companies were expected to create new HEP products to
meet the needs of homeowners, whose equity stakes were ravaged by the
Great Recession.
Despite this initial optimism, the U.S. market for HEP contracts has
been relatively weak. New alternatives have been slow in developing, and
liquidity in existing markets has been shallow.

This contract had a 30-year maturity and one-time, up-front premium equal to
about 1.5% of the protected value. Its creators felt that charging annual fees would
encourage customers to drop this insurance if their home prices increased, thereby
leaving the policyholder pool with only high-risk families. The loss of customers in
this way could also decimate the HEP company’s ability to pay claims due to the
diminishing pool of invested funds.
7

2016
III.

HEP COMPANIES AND CONTRACTS

7

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR WEAK HEP DEMAND AND
SUPPLY?

HEP markets grow fastest when there are simultaneous increases in
both the supply of and demand for these contracts. Unfortunately, problems
on both sides of the market have been evident.
A.

REASONS FOR WEAK HEP DEMAND

HEP demand is inversely related to home price expectations.8 It rises
when expected home prices fall, due to the clear and present danger of wealth
erosion, and falls when expected home prices rise, causing these fears to
diminish. As Exhibit 2 shows, during the past 40 years, home prices have
increased more often than they have decreased.
Exhibit 2
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index
January 1975 to October 2015
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William N. Goetzmann, Andrew Caplin, Eric Hangen, Barry J. Nalebuff,
Elisabeth Prentice, John Rodkin, Matthew I. Spiegel, & Tom Skinner, Home Equity
Insurance: A Pilot Project 4, 9 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12,
2003).
8
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Households:
Owners Equity in Real Estate, Level, (2014), accessed January 5, 2016,
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CSUSHPINSA/downloaddata.
Lackluster demand for HEP insurance contracts has also been
caused by sluggish home sales in the particular communities where they have
been offered. Because these contracts are likely to be purchased at the same
time as homes, their demand should rise and fall with home sales.9 Therefore,
factors that reduce the demand for homes also lessen the demand for HEP
insurance contracts. Among these reasons are recessions, burdensomely high
real interest rates, high property tax rates, demographic changes, and
financial disincentives, such as the availability and cost of land, which cause
residents to move from urban neighborhoods, where HEP experiments have
been tried, to rural areas.
The demand for HEP financial products, such as options, forward,
and futures contracts, has been as weak at the demand for HEP insurance
products. A major cause of this weakness can be traced to homeowners’
concerns about and unfamiliarity with the risk-return tradeoffs of derivative
markets.
B.

REASONS FOR WEAK HEP SUPPLY

HEP contracts are mainly supplied by investors and speculators who
want to increase their real estate exposures. Insurance companies that are
willing and able to manage real estate price risks are also potential suppliers.
Part of the uninspired increase in HEP supply can be attributed to internal
problems related to suppliers’ strategies and management, but relatively high
real estate transaction costs, regulations, and perceived risks are also to
blame.
C.

INTERNAL HEP COMPANY PROBLEMS

Managerial ineffectiveness and poorly constructed business plans
result in over-priced policies, high administrative costs, bureaucratic red tape
(e.g., causing delays in vetting claims), and contracts excessively loaded with

When a home is purchased, individuals have legal counsel and the advice of
friends and family, which could be used to make knowledgeable decisions about
these contracts. Focus groups have confirmed that potential customers feel the most
important time to purchase a HEP contract is when a home is purchased. See Id.
9
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unattractive features, such as high deductibles, long vesting periods, and
severe restrictions on claims.
D.

HIGH REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION COSTS

Due to the high transactions costs associated with buying and selling
homes, such as brokerage fees, closing costs, and moving expenses,
residential real estate markets are highly inefficient relative to their
counterparts in the commodity, currency, equity, and debt markets.10
Professional investors are likely to shun exchange-traded and over-thecounter (OTC)-traded HEP financial instruments due to their lack of
sufficient liquidity. Among the reasons for these shallow markets are the (1)
lack of readily available homes that can be inventoried and sold at a
moment’s notice, (2) relatively unknown relationships between residential
real estate returns and those on other portfolio assets, (3) relatively high real
estate price volatility, (4) paucity of hedging alternatives, and (5) inability to
derive meaningful option prices due to the problematic relationship between
most option pricing models and the real estate market. These markets violate
important assumptions that lie behind popular contingent option pricing
models, such as the Black-Scholes-Merton formula. For example, real estate:
(1) prices do not move randomly – especially in the short term,11 (2)
transactions are not costless, (3) markets are not liquid, and (4) cash market
prices and derivative market prices are difficult or impossible to arbitrage.12

If enough people participated, exchange markets in HEP contracts could help
predict future real estate prices.
11
Residential home prices display a significant degree of autocorrelation (i.e.,
inertia), which improves short-term forecasts but reduces the accuracy of option
pricing models. See Robert J. Shiller, Derivatives Markets for Home Prices 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w13962, April 2008).
12
Nevertheless, pricing models have been developed, which try to overcome
these obstacles. See Robert A. Jarrow, A Simple Robust Model for Cat Bond
Valuation, 7 FIN. RES. LETTERS 72 (2010); ALEXANDER MELNIKOV, RISK ANALYSIS
IN FINANCE AND INSURANCE (Chapman & Hall 2004); James A. Boness, Elements
of a Theory of Option Value, 72 J. POL. ECON. 163 (1974); Paul A. Samuelson,
Rational Theory of Warrant Pricing, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 13 (1965); George
Constantinides, Market Risk Adjustment in Project Evaluation, 33 J. OF FIN. 603
(1978); Robert J. Shiller, supra, note 11; 3 JONATHAN E. INGERSOLL, J. E., THEORY
OF FIN. DECISION MAKING (Rowman & Littlefield 1987).
10
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E.

REGULATION AND PERCEIVED RISKS

The existence of high regulatory costs and perceived risks also
explains the slow growth of HEP insurance contracts. Regulatory costs deter
start-up companies from entering markets and, for those that already offer
these contracts, compliance costs can substantially reduce profits. On the
positive side, regulations may increase consumer confidence, thereby
encouraging HEP companies to offer supervised contracts. State laws and
insurance commission rules regulate companies that offer FGI contracts. As
a result, an FGI company must be licensed and comply with the rules and
regulations of each state in which it operates.
Expensive regulations could cause the failure of HEP insurance
companies, which means a company that offers FGI contracts and fails might
have survived and thrived, in the same state, if it had been permitted to offer
unregulated NIFP contracts. Due to the relatively small historical sample size
and multitude of possible causes of HEP company failures, econometrically
pinning success or failure on differences in regulation is challenging.
Colorado-based Home Value Insurance Company (HVIC) and
Ohio-based EquityLock Solutions, LLC (ELS) help frame the FGI-versusNIFP issue. Both companies began operations in 2011, offered similar HEP
contracts, and neither of them had legacy policies from the pre-Great
Recession years. One major difference was HVIC was regulated as an FGI
company and ELS escaped state regulation because it was deemed to offer
NIFP. Despite seemingly favorable market conditions, HVIC suspended
policy sales in August 2012 and received court-approved dissolution the
following December. By contrast, ELS was still a going concern, as of
January 2016. Differences in regulations may or may not have been a major
cause of ELS’s survival and HVIC’s demise, but over-regulation carries
associated costs, and under-regulation carries potential risks to consumers.
Therefore, determining the basis on which HEP companies should be
regulated has important implications.
IV.

THREE REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES FOR HEP
CONTRACTS

HEP contracts are hybrids, having both insurance-like and financialproduct-like features, which explains inconsistencies between states in
determining the regulatory status of HEP companies and why states vary
their positions over time. Currently, U.S. companies wishing to sell HEP
contracts face the three major regulatory alternatives. First, if a state decides
that the contract is permissible FGI, then the company is regulated as an
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insurance company. If the contract is deemed impermissible FGI (i.e., not on
the list of state-approved FGI contracts), then the company is prohibited from
selling this product in that state, and attempts to do so would be met with
cease-and-desist orders. Finally, if a state decides that the contract is NIFP,
then it escapes state insurance regulations and may also escape federal
regulations. The dilemma with classifying an HEP contract as impermissible
FGI is that it inhibits the development of a market with potentially high value
to the average resident homeowner. By contrast, the problem with classifying
it as an NIFP product is companies offering contracts on OTC markets may
avoid all regulation, thereby, leaving state residents unprotected from illicit
companies and policies.
The experience of New York State’s Department of Financial
Services (NY DFS) provides an example of the difficulties that regulators
may encounter when they try to classify HEP contracts. In 2002, NY DFS
ruled that a proposed HEP contract “does not constitute insurance and
contracts entered into with homebuyers pursuant to the Program will not be
viewed as insurance contracts.”13 About four-and-a-half years later, in 2008,
NY DFS changed its opinion and ruled that these contracts are impermissible
FGI.14 Subsequently, this new ruling was reinforced by opinions published
on 200815 and 2011.16
The locus of regulatory authority for NIFP contracts depends on
whether they are exchange-traded or OTC-traded products and whether they
are securities or derivatives. Companies that offer exchange-traded securities
or options on securities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Those offering exchange-traded derivatives are
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and
finally, companies that offer OTC financial contracts escape federal
regulations. Rather, the rights of NIFP buyers and sellers are protected
mainly by commercial law through the courts. In cases where there are
disagreements as to the locus of regulatory authority, the courts decide, and

See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., Re: Home Equity Protection Program,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2002/rg205012.htm (accessed Jan. 1, 2016).
14
See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., Re: Home Equity Protection Plan Proposal
(2008), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2008/rg080111.htm (accessed Jan. 1,
2016).
15
Id.
16
Id. This decision focused on a HEP contract offered by a non-profit
organization. The ruling confirmed that the contract was, indeed, insurance.
13
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they have relatively wide discretion in determining what is and is not an
insurance product.
FGI companies must meet all state licensure requirements and obey
the statutes and rules that are passed by state legislatures and, subsequently,
promulgated and enforced by state insurance departments/commissions.17
Among the most important requirements are minimum capital and
contingency reserve levels, aggregate and single counterparty risk
limitations, and exposure-to-equity ratios. Even though HEP companies that
offer OTC products may escape almost all regulations, their policyholders
have enforceable rights under state and federal contract laws, making courts
and the nation’s judicial system (rather than insurance commissions) the
major checks and balances on these NIFP-types of HEP contracts.
V.

MATERIAL INTEREST18: RISK TRANSFER VERSUS RISK
TRANSFORMATION

HEP contracts can be used to transfer or transform fortuitous risks.
Transferring home price risk means buying protection against home price
reductions. Transforming it means buying and/or selling this price protection
to increase, decrease, eliminate, or otherwise alter the risk-return tradeoffs
of residential real estate exposures. Transferring risks implies possession of
an underlying material interest, but material interest has an important added
function, which is to prevent Individual A from purchasing an insurance
policy on Individual B’s home, which would allow Individual A to benefit
from Individual B’s misfortune and, possibly, incentivize Individual A to
cause the misfortune.
FGI products are designed to transfer home price risks from
customers to insurance companies, which concentrate the risks of dispersed
Most state regulations focus on insurance sellers, but policy buyers also
have responsibilities, such as disclosing all risks that are known at the time a
contract is initiated. Publically traded companies that issue financial instruments do
not face this requirement.
18
The origins of material interest can be traced to the 18th and 19th centuries,
when Anglo-Saxon nations created legislative restrictions on gambling. For years
prior to that, contracts did not require material interests or indemnification to qualify
as “insurance.” See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 237 (1996), https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/thbaker/Tom-Baker-On-theGenealogy-of-Moral-Hazard.pdf; see also Geoffrey W. Clark, Betting on Lives: The
Culture of Life Insurance in England: 1695 – 1775 (Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
17
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policyholders and then manage them, in aggregate, mainly by means of
policy diversification (geographic, demographic, and temporal), reserve
provisions, owners’ equity, reinsurance, derivatives, deductibles, and
managed pools of invested premiums. Most FGI customers: (1) have
relatively unsophisticated financial skills, (2) infrequently (if ever) mark
their insurance contracts to market, (3) rarely make decisions about whether
to hedge or unhedged their home equity positions, and, (4) generally, want
to free themselves from frequent investment decisions regarding their homes.
Paying insurance premiums allows these individuals to protect their equity
stakes against downside home price risks while simultaneously enjoying the
benefits of upside price potential.19 In this respect, FGI contracts are like
financial put options.
By contrast, NIFP contracts are designed for investors and
speculators who wish to transform home price risks. In contrast to insurance
companies, which concentrate risks, NIFP companies widely distribute them
among financial counterparties. Risk transformers are best viewed in the
context of optimizing the return on diversified portfolios of assets, which
means they are not the focus of state insurance commissions.
VI.

FGI, INDEMNIFICATION, AND THE USE OF PRICE INDICES

Ideally, an FGI contract should fully indemnify the contract holder
for fortuitous losses, while simultaneously offering no opportunities to earn
profits or incur net losses. This goal can only be accomplished if the contract
ties customer claims to the fair market purchase and sales prices of a home,
but doing so creates problems that could threaten the financial sustainability
of any company offering HEP contracts, which would curtail the growth of
this industry. In short, states that require full indemnification for a HEP
contract to be considered FGI could be making “the best” an enemy of “the
good.”
HEP companies, such as EquityLock Solutions, argue that the use of
price indices is evidence that its policies are financial (not insurance)
contracts because homeowners can have material interest in their homes but
not in real estate price indices. They buttress this argument with the fact that
full indemnification cannot be guaranteed because it is possible for a
protected home’s price to change independently from the housing price
index.
These arguments are unconvincing on four grounds. First, a
declining local real estate price index implies relative reductions in the value
19

Shiller & Weiss, supra note 2.
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of all properties in that area. Even homes that appreciate in value (e.g., due
to renovations, refashioning, improvements, enlargement, or historical
significance) when price indices fall are affected by declining average home
values because their sales prices would have been higher in rising markets.20
Second, because they have maximum payouts, even HEP contracts that tie
claims to transactions prices fail to fully indemnify contract holders, once
the maximum payout is exceeded (more about this later). Therefore, only
contracts with no maximum payouts can fully indemnify customers under all
price-change scenarios. Third, each homeowner has, at least, a partial
material interest in a local price index. Finally, the use of transaction prices
encourages collusion, deceit, and asymmetric information problems between
homebuyers and sellers, which could lead to the failure of companies
offering these contracts (more about this later). As a result, states that
automatically classify contracts offering price-index-linked HEP claims as
NIFP emasculate their abilities to protect residents from ill-conceived and
illegitimate providers.
A.

A CLOSER LOOK AT HEP INDEMNIFICATION

Exhibit 3 shows payoff profiles for an individual who has a long real
estate position and owns a HEP contract with a 25% cap on claim payments.
This position is equivalent to owning a hybrid security with a (1) long home
position, (2) long, at-the-money put option, and (3) short, out-of-the-money
(by 25%) put option. For a homeowner, the short put is the speculative part
of this financial hybrid, and it is technically inconsistent with, what is
normally thought of as, insurance. The short put’s purpose is mainly to
reduce potential claims facing FGI companies and, also, to reduce the policy
premium. To minimize the importance of this speculative component, the
short put’s strike price would be set as low as possible.
Exhibit 3A assumes the HEP payout is tied to the percentage change
in a home’s market value (HEP-CHV), and Exhibit 3B assumes the contract
is tied to a percentage change in the housing price index (HEP-IND).21 The
HEP-CHV payoff profile, which is shown in Exhibit 3A, is the discontinuous
line labeled ABCD, and the HEP-IND payoff profile is the discontinuous
line labeled ABCD, which is shown in Exhibit 3B. Due to the
This reasoning is consistent with NY DFS’ written opinion, which changed
its position on whether HEP contracts were NIFP or FGI. See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV.,
supra note 14.
21
To simplify the graphs, these examples assume that the home is 100%
financed.
20

2016

HEP COMPANIES AND CONTRACTS

15

maximum payout limit (e.g., 25%), neither contract provides complete
indemnification relative to its underlier price (see segments AB in Exhibit
3A and AB in Exhibit 3B). At the same time, both contracts allow owners
to enjoy capital gains when home prices rise (see segments CD in Exhibit
3A and CD in Exhibit 3B).
Exhibit 3
Relationship between HEP-CHV and HEP-IND Contracts

% Homeowner's Wealth

A
Payoff Profile of HEP-CHV
50%

D

25%

B

0%
-25%

C

A

-50%
-50%

-25%

0%

25%

% Home's (Market) Price

% Homeowner's Wealth

B
Payoff Profile of HEP-IND
50%

D'

25%

B'

0%
-25%

C'

A'

-50%
-50%

-25%

0%

25%

% Housing Price Index

An important conclusion to draw from Exhibits 3A and 3B is that
distinctions between FGI and NIFP, which seem to be based on
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indemnification, are actually distinctions about whether the maximum
payout on a HEP contract is sufficiently large to be called indemnification
because, once the maximum payout percent is reached, indemnification
stops.
VII.

ADVANTAGES OF USING HOME-PRICE-INDEXED HEP
CONTRACTS

Linking HEP contracts to home price indices has both social and
individual advantages, such as: (1) encouraging home maintenance,
improvements, and repairs, (2) enabling existing homeowners to purchase
these contracts, (3) permitting individuals to make claims without selling
their homes, and (4) reducing illicit customer claims.
A.

PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS ENCOURAGE HOME
MAINTENANCE, IMPROVEMENTS, AND REPAIRS

In Exhibit 4, the payoff profiles for the HEP-CHV and HEP-IND
contracts provide illuminating insights when both of them are evaluated
relative to changes in a home’s current market price. The HEP-CHV contract
has the same asymmetric payoff profile (ABCD) shown in Exhibit 3A.
By contrast, the HEP-IND contract now has a symmetric payoff profile (like
a long forward contract), which shifts to the left as the price index falls and
shifts to the right as it rises. Therefore, if the price index falls, the HEP-IND
payoff profile changes, for example, from ZD to an interior line, such as
RS (see Exhibit 4).
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Exhibit 4
Payoffs When Changes in a Home’s Price and the Price Index Are Not
Perfectly Correlated
X

% Homeowner’s Wealth

+50%

S
D

+25%
B

0%

C
A

-25%
R

-50%

Z

50%

 25%

0

+25%

% Home (Market) Price
If there was a perfect, one-for-one inverse relationship between
changes in home prices and changes in housing price indices, the payoff
profile for HEP-IND would be identical to the payoff profile of HEP-CHV,
namely, ABCD in Exhibit 4. By contrast, if these prices were not
perfectly correlated, the payoff profile labeled AX would be the left-side
limit to which the HEP-IND contract could move, and it would be reached
once the price index fell by 25% or more. The payoff profile labeled ZD
would be the right-side limit of the HEP-IND contract, which would be
reached when price index remained the same or rose.
In the range of prices between B and C, changes in the price index
vary between 25% (i.e., the maximum payout) and positive infinity. If price
index falls by a greater percentage than the market value of a home, the
wealth of the HEP-IND contract owner rises (see the gray area above BC
in Exhibit 4). Similarly, in the range BC, if a home’s market value falls by
a greater percentage than the price index, the wealth of a HEP-IND contract
owner falls (see the gray area below BC in Exhibit 4).
An important conclusion to draw from Exhibit 4 is HEP-IND
contracts promote behavior that enhances social welfare because owners are
over-indemnified only when the market values of their homes fall by less
than the price index. Therefore, added compensation comes only by beating
the average, which encourages overall home care and maintenance.
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B.

PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS CAN BE PURCHASED BY
EXISTING HOME OWNERS

Individuals who already own homes and those purchasing them both
have material interests, but potential problems can arise when HEP contracts
are sold to the former group because reliable market values for the protected
assets may be lacking in the absence of actual home sales. If this problem
were insurmountable, then HEP contracts might be restricted to only
individuals who are purchasing homes.
One way to offer these contracts to existing homeowners is by using
mutually agreeable, independent appraisers to determine home values;22
another is to use housing price indices to inflate or deflate property values
from their original purchase prices to the current index-adjusted values and,
then, use the differences as the basis for claims. Therefore, the HEP payout
per home would equal the percentage change in the price index times the
protected value.
C.

PRICE-INDEXED HEP INSURANCE CONTRACTS ALLOW CLAIMS
AT CONTRACT MATURITY, WITHOUT HOME SALES

HEP insurance contracts could be written to allow claims (1) only
when a home is sold, (2) at contract maturity, or (3) any time before the
contract matures. The differences are important.
1. Allowing claims only upon the sale of a home
Restricting HEP insurance claims solely to contract owners who sell
their homes at a loss has two major advantages. First, it clearly establishes
the contract as a risk-transfer vehicle that protects against unfortunate,
fortuitous life events. Second, the requirement significantly reduces the
liquidity risks facing HEP insurance companies because it moderates claims
by broadly distributing them over time (i.e., temporal diversification).
2. Paying claims at contract maturity
Allowing individuals to make claims when their contracts mature
raises questions regarding how a home’s market price can be determined in
the absence of a free market sale. As previously mentioned, one solution is
22

Shiller and Weiss, supra note 2, at 25.
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to use independent external appraisers, and another is to tie claims to changes
in price indices.
A major advantage of allowing individuals to make claims on HEP
contracts at maturity, without the need to sell their homes, is it improves the
long-term hedging effectiveness of these contracts.23 Consider an individual
who simultaneously purchases a $100,000 home and 10-year HEP contract.
To finance the transaction, suppose he/she borrows $90,000 and makes a
$10,000 down payment. At maturity, if the home’s market value falls to
$95,000 and the price index falls to 95, the homeowner is unlikely to sell
his/her home and relocate in order to collect just $5,000 in claims.
Transaction costs are too high. As a result, if the contract is renewed at the
home’s current market value (i.e., $95,000), the individual’s wealth would
fall by $5,000. By contrast, if this HEP owner could make a claim without
selling his/her home at maturity, s/he would receive $5,000 in claims and
then be able to re-protect the home for $95,000, thereby retaining his/her
equity at the original level of $10,000.
Because selling a home and moving to a new location can be costly,
the sales price must fall considerably to offer attractive opportunities. At a
minimum, the home price reduction needs to exceed the monetary costs (e.g.,
realtor’s fees, moving expenses, and refurbishments) and the emotional costs
that come from leaving familiar friends, schools, and social networks.
Evidence in the market for mortgage insurance indicates that a home’s
market value needs to fall at least 10% to 25%24 below the outstanding
This practice is common for non-delivery derivative contracts, such as those
purchased and sold on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).
24
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints
to Strategic Default on Mortgages 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15145, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15145.pdf (accessed Jan. 1,
2016). Neil Bhutta, Jane Dokko, & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and
Mortgage Default Decisions 43 (FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES
2010-35,
2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf, (accessed
Jan. 1, 2016); Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Negative
Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON. 234 (2008);
EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN, Understanding Strategic Default in Mortgages Part I
(Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Report 2009 Topical Report Series,
2009); EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN, Strategic Defaults in Mortgages: Q2 2011
Update, Market Intelligence Reports (2011 Topical Report Series, 2011),
https://www.experian.com/assets/decision-analytics/reports/oliver-wymanstrategic-default-2011.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2016); EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN,
23
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mortgage value to trigger a strategic default, which occurs when individuals,
who can afford to pay their mortgages, walk away from them because the
market values of their homes are less than the outstanding mortgage balances
(i.e., they have negative equity).25
3. Allowing claims any time before contract maturity
Allowing policyholders to make claims any time before contracts
mature changes a HEP policy from a risk transfer agent to a risk transformer.
Such flexibility also complicates the efforts of these companies to predict
future claim liabilities and, thereby, results in higher premiums, which
reduce the amount of protection purchased.26 Furthermore, permitting such
flexibility distances these HEP policies from the fortuitous, unfortunate lifeevents they are supposed to address.
D.

PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS CAN REDUCE ILLEGITIMATE
CUSTOMER CLAIMS

HEP insurance companies can be the victims of asymmetric
information problems, as well as collusion and deceit.27 Asymmetric
information occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better
information than his/her counterpart. Collusion and deceit can occur when
individuals sell their homes to collaborators at unjustifiably low prices, make
illicit HEP claims, and then split the ill-gotten gains.

Strategic Defaults in Mortgages: Q2 2010 update (Market Intelligence Reports,
2010 Topical Report Series, 2010), https://www.experian.com/assets/decisionanalytics/reports/strategic-default-report-2-2010.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2016).
25
Strategic defaults can also be caused by double-trigger events, such as
negative equity in combination with pessimistic expectations about housing prices.
Therefore, even if negative equity is the primary cause of a strategic default, it may
not be the only cause.
26
It is virtually impossible for a HEP company to hedge the risk of contract
cancellations. While the average duration of a contract might be estimated, its
variance is tied closely to whether home prices rise or fall, thereby leaving these
companies vulnerable to significant over-estimations or under-estimations of
revenues.
27
See Karl E. Case, Robert J. Shiller & Allen N. Weiss, Mortgage Default Risk
and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate
(Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1098, 1995), http://cowles.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/pub/d10/d1098.pdf; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 2.
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1. Asymmetric information
Two major types of asymmetric information are adverse selection,
which occurs before a contract has been signed, and moral hazard, which
occurs afterwards. Both cause potential problems for HEP insurance
companies.
a. Adverse selection
Home sellers are likely to have better information than FGI
companies about the fair market values of their particular houses and also
about specific community risks. For instance, individuals who feel they
overpaid for their homes or live in areas with substantial downside price risks
(e.g., due to increasing crime rates) are likely to be HEP buyers. Conversely,
those who feel they paid bargains prices for their homes or live in areas with
substantial upward price potential are unlikely buyers of these contracts.
Therefore, asymmetric information introduces selection biases into the pool
of potential HEP insurance customers, weighting the population toward
those most in need, which increases claim risk and renders statistical
analyses problematic – especially when predictive validity and reliability
depend on customer pools having normal distributions. These added risks
increase customer premiums, which reduce the amount of protection
purchased.
b. Moral hazard
Moral hazard occurs when individuals behave differently after they
are insured because they no longer bear the full consequences of their actions
and also when they can influence both the odds and size of their potential
claims. On the demand side, HEP contracts encourage individuals to pay
above-market prices for their homes, knowing that their downside market
risks are hedged. In fact, losses on properties that have been owned for long
periods of time have been traced to their owners paying too much for them.28
On the supply side, HEP contracts reduce sellers’ incentives to negotiate the
best prices in down markets because they know that losses, up to the
maximum limits, will be covered by insurance. HEP contracts also
Between 1990 and 2006, about 50% to 60% of the homes sold in the
Melbourne, Australia area were estimated to have incurred losses due to initial
overpayments. See Dag Einar Sommervoll & Gavin Wood, Home Equity Insurance,
3 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 66, 75 (2011).
28
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discourage homeowners from preforming routine maintenance on protected
properties, and they encourage fanciful decorating, which could reduce a
home’s sales price. One way companies could try to protect themselves from
this moral hazard problem is by requiring evidence of minimum
maintenance, but such arrangements are difficult to enforce because
objective verification of needed repairs may not be possible and the timing
of such work is open to discretion.29 Another alternative is for HEP insurance
companies to retain the right of first refusal, which would allow them to
purchase and then resell homes whose sales prices seem unjustifiably low.
c. Using a price index to solve collusion, deceit,
and asymmetric information problems
The major benefit of using transaction prices to determine HEP
claims is the clear line of sight they provide between changes in the equity
an owner has at risk and changes in the value of the protection contract. The
major disadvantage is these contracts encourage collusion, deceit, and
asymmetric information problems. One solution to this problem is to base
claims on home price indices because companies that supply these contracts
do not need to appraise or monitor the protected homes. Price indices can
reduce these problems by disconnecting HEP claims from property sales
prices. Therefore, regardless of how far below the market price a home is
sold, claims can be made only if the housing price index (over which the
individual has no power) falls from beginning to end.
Consider the problems of collusion and deceit. Suppose a home with
an initial market value of $100,000 is purchased simultaneously with a HEP
contract having a maximum payout of 25%. Suppose further that, when the
home is sold (after the vesting period), its market value remains the same,
but the owner tries to deceive the HEP company by selling the house to an
accomplice for a below-market price equal to $85,000. Exhibit 5 assumes
that all the proceeds from this collusive act ($15,000) revert, in the form of
a kickback, to the original homeowner. It compares the results if claims are
based on the property’s transaction prices versus a home price index, which
rises by 10%, stays the same, or falls by 10%, 15%, and 40%.

29

Shiller and Weiss, supra note 2, at 25,27.
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Exhibit 5
Payoffs to Collusion and Deceit: Transaction-Price versus Price-Indexed
Contracts*
Contract Initiation
Purchase price
Price Index

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

100

100

100

100

100

+10%

0%

10%

15%

40%

Contract Termination
% Home Price Index

Return to the collusive seller when transaction prices are used
Purchase price

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

Unfair sales price

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

Claim

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

Kickback

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

Net gain for the seller

+$15,000

+$15,000

+$15,000

+$15,000

+$15,000

Purchase price  sales
price

Return to the collusive seller when a price index is used
Purchase price
Unfair sales price
HEP Claim

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

0

0

$10,000

$15,000

$25,000**

If %PI < 0, then claims = % price index × protected value; otherwise, claims = 0.
Kickback
Net gain for the seller

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$0

$0

$10,000

$15,000

+$25,000

* Assets and claims are positive values. Liabilities are negative values. This example ignores mortgage
amortization.
** The maximum payout is 25%. Therefore, the price index can fall no lower than 75 when prices decline by
25% or more.

Notice that the transaction-price alternative locks in a $15,000 gain,
but the price-index-alternative gains nothing if the price index rises or stays
the same. It progressively earns positive returns as the price index falls,
reaching a maximum gain of $25,000 when the percentage change in the
price index reaches the payoff limit of 25%. Exhibit 5 shows that it is
possible for the seller to gain more under the price-index alternative than the
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transaction-price alternative only if the price index declines by a greater
percent than the home’s market price.
HEP companies could eliminate this profit loophole by basing
claims on the higher of a home’s market price or housing price index. Exhibit
6 shows the results from this hybrid method. Notice how losses to the
colluding seller are the same as Exhibit 5 until the price index falls by a
greater percent than the sales price, at which point the hybrid method reduces
the sellers’ gains from what would have occurred using the price-index
method.
Exhibit 6
Payoffs to Collusion and Deceit if Claims are Based the Higher of the
Sales Price or Price-Indexed Price*
Contract Initiation
Purchase price of home

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

+10%

0%

10%

15%

40%

Price index-value

$110,000

$100,000

$90,000

$85,000

$75,000**

Unfair sales price

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$85,000

$0

$0

$10,000

$15,000

$15,000

Contract Termination
% Home Price Index

HEP Claim

Claims = higher of (1) (sales price  purchase price) or (2) if %PI < 0, (% price index ×
protected value), otherwise, claims = 0
Kickback
Net gain to collusive seller

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$0

$0

$10,000

$15,000

$15,000

* Assets and claims are positive values. Liabilities are negative values. This example ignores
mortgage amortization.
** Maximum payout is 25%

Customer perceptions about the fairness of the hybrid method might
be improved if the HEP contract required the insurer and customer to share
the burden when a home’s sales price fell by a greater percent than the price
index. Employing deductibles into these contracts would also reduce or
eliminate collusion, deceit, and moral hazard problems because it would
force homeowners to have skin-in-the-game, thereby preventing them from
extracting the full benefits of their unethical acts.
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DISADVANTAGES OF USING HOME-PRICE-INDEXED HEP
CONTRACTS

Using home price indices is one of the keys to successfully offering
and developing HEP contracts and markets. For this reason, serious attention
has been paid to improving price index methodology30 and narrowing index
coverage to increasingly tapered geographic areas, but until these indices can
pinpoint each particular home, the chances for full (100%) indemnification
will remain small.
The indemnification problem is not unique to the housing market
and relates to basis risk, which exists when changes in the value of a
protected asset or liability are not equal and opposite to changes the value of
the protection contract. As basis risk rises, the likelihood that a hedge will
fully indemnify the contract owner falls. For example, a U.S. company with
a €20 million accounts receivable maturing in November might use a
September or December futures contract to hedge because November futures
contracts do not exist. Similarly, oil producers may try to hedge the value of
their committed sales with futures contracts offered on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, where the Brent oil benchmark is used, even though
the blend of oils in this benchmark does not fully match the producers’
specific oil output.
Basis risk can cause homeowners to be either under-compensated or
over-compensated whenever the housing price indices used do not have oneto-one, inverse relationships with the protected homes’ sales prices. Under
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards (FAS), a transaction qualifies as a
hedge if it is identified, as such, at inception and achieves its goal within a
predefined range.31 FAS rules do not differentiate hedge transaction from
See Shiller, Derivative Markets for Home Prices 4, 9-10 (Yale Univ. Econ.
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 46; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1648,
2008); Karl E. Case, Robert J. Shiller, & Allan N. Weiss, Mortgage Default Risk
and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5078, 1995).
31
Under U.S. Financial Accounting Standard 133, a hedge must be declared
when it is purchased (i.e., at inception), and the correlation coefficient between the
asset and hedge must range between -0.80 and +1.25, which means any gains above
25% or losses below 20% are treated, for financial statement purposes, as non-hedge
transactions. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, Financial Standards No. 133:
Accounting
for
Derivative
Instruments
and
Hedging
Activities,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220124631
&acceptedDisclaimer=true (accessed Jan. 1, 2016).
30
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investment and speculation transactions based on not whether they guarantee
100% indemnification. In terms of payoff profiles, hedge contracts are
identical to insurance contracts.
If FAS logic were applied to HEP contracts, a company would be
classified as offering FGI if: (1) each buyer’s intention, at inception and until
maturity, was to hedge the value of his/her home equity position, and (2)
indemnification was permitted to vary within reasonable, predetermined
limits. Ensuring that HEP customers are hedging (i.e., transferring risks) and
not speculating (i.e., transforming risks) can be accomplished by requiring
material interest from contract initiation to termination or maturity.
Whether the HEP contract is effective can be evaluated by its payout
efficiency, which is the: (1) portion of paid claims that go to individuals who
incur losses on the sale of their homes32 and/or (2) the extent to which
homeowners who incur losses are compensated. Therefore, a 0.0 measure
implies that individuals who incurred losses on their home sales were not
compensated at all by HEP policies, and a 1.0 measure implies full
indemnification.
A study in Melbourne, Australia,33 using metropolitan and
neighborhood housing price indices to determine HEP payout efficiency,
found that between half and slightly less than two-thirds of the people who
experienced home equity losses would have been compensated by these
contracts.34 Payout efficiency improved when contract maturity was
lengthened.
To implement price-indexed FGI contracts, U.S. states could
establish allowable limits for payout efficiency, perhaps beginning with U.S.
FAS standards and then adjusting them with experience. New FGI
companies might be required by state insurance commissions to show
evidence that threshold payout efficiencies could be reached before they sell
their contracts. Such requirements would promote the creation of better
home price indices and also encourage the development of private market
solutions that protect home equity. Because the level of basis risk depends
heavily on the index chosen, results could be back-checked, periodically, to
Remember that, in a declining market, HEP contracts would also pay claims
to individuals whose homes rose in price or remained constant.
33
Australia’s housing market is similar to the United States in that
approximately 70% of families own homes and home equity constitutes about 40%
of the average family’s wealth.
34
Sommervoll & Wood, supra note 28. This study did not allow for moral
hazard and adverse selection, which could significantly affect the study’s
conclusions.
32
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make sure the best-in-class housing price indices were being used. Earnings
or losses that fell outside the predetermined bounds could be taxed as
ordinary income.
A.

REGULATORY
CONTRACTS

ARBITRAGE

AND

PRICE-INDEXED

HEP

The attributes of HEP contracts are endogenous, in the sense that
companies can configure them to gain or circumvent state regulation.
Problems arise when these attributes meet the letter of the law but not its
intent. One way these companies can engage in regulatory arbitrage is by
establishing themselves as NIFP companies in states that permit it and then
transforming their financial liabilities into insurance liabilities via special
purpose vehicles (i.e., transformer companies). Companies may gain NIFP
status by linking their contracts to home price indices, which do not
guarantee full indemnification and, therefore, do not meet the pure definition
of insurance. Once established as NIFP companies, they try to conduct
business in other states, either by offering NIFP contracts directly or by using
surplus lines brokers.
B.

TRANSFORMER COMPANIES

Transformer companies can convert financial risks into insurance
risks or vice versa. They may be independent from the HEP firms with which
they deal or created and capitalized by the HEP companies, themselves.
Therefore, a company can (1) sell its contracts as financial products in one
state, (2) create an FGI company in a different state, country, or offshore
center that has lower standards, and (3) then use this FGI company as
evidence to potential and existing customers that its contracts are safe.
Problems can arise when this type of regulatory arbitrage creates only the
illusion of safety. The likelihood of this happening is relatively high when
the standards regulating the relationships between in-state NIFP companies
and out-of-state FGI companies, which are business-to-business (B2B)
transactions, are weaker than the standards regulating in-state business-tocustomer (B2C) transactions.
Resident victimization could result if the buyers of these FGI
contracts are unlikely to understand or take the time to discover that an outof-state FGI company is owned or controlled by the in-state NIFP firm and,
therefore, offers little additional protection. Similarly, problems could arise
when the out-of-state FGI company’s policies, procedures, and financial
structure would not pass in-state insurance standards. One way states can
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defend residents against potential abuses of transformer companies is to
allow them only for licensed insurers in state-authorized locations.
C.

SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE AND BROKERS

Surplus lines insurance permits a state’s residents to purchase
insurance from out-of-state property and casualty insurance companies via
licensed in-state surplus lines brokers. The out-of-state insurers bear the real
estate price risks and collect premiums for these services. Surplus lines
brokers are used when a type of property or casualty insurance is not offered
by any insurance company in a particular state. Therefore, an insurance
company in State A can sell its policies in States B, C, and D by offering a
unique insurance product and then finding surplus lines brokers in other
states that are willing and able to sell it. The use of surplus lines brokers
eliminates the time, effort, and expense of gaining licenses in these other
states.35 If surplus lines brokers are used for purposes of regulatory arbitrage,
states can try to control this practice by restricting transactions to licensed
FGI companies that are located in pre-approved states, countries, and
offshore centers.
IX.

CONCLUSION

HEP contracts can transfer home price risks from those who are least
able to evaluate them to those who are best able. These contracts can more
fully develop capital markets by providing a low-cost and efficient means of
shorting the housing market, thereby making real estate prices more efficient
and reducing the likelihood of speculative distortions, such as price bubbles.
Less distorted prices, lower transactions costs, and greater liquidity act to
encourage capital flows toward real estate markets, thereby increasing
aggregate investments. Even in cases where the correlation between the
homes being insured and the real estate price index used for hedging is not
exact, HEP products can bring substantial value to many homeowners who
are seeking ways to protect the home equity they have accumulated.
Linking FGI contracts to home price indices is a practical and
effective way to develop the HEP market while protecting both HEP
insurance customers and companies. Price indexed FGI contracts: (1)
encourage home maintenance, improvements, and repairs, (2) more fully
open the HEP market to existing homeowners, (3) offer protection to
35
If a state insurance regulator determines that the contract offered in
impermissible FGI, then it cannot be sold in that state via surplus lines brokers.
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individuals who do not wish to sell their homes, and (4) help defend FGI
contract suppliers from customer collusion, deceit, and asymmetric
information problems. At the same time, states can retain more rights than
they relinquish, which enables them to protect resident homeowners, who
are the likely victims of illicit HEP companies and contracts.
For all the years that HEP insurance contacts have been offered,
states have wrestled with regulating them appropriately, taxing them fairly,
and allowing these markets to function effectively. Solving regulatory issues
related to HEP contracts is not a singular cause because these debates will
continue to surface, as they have in the past, when financial instruments (e.g.,
weather derivatives, credit default swaps, and catastrophe options) were
invented and offered for sale.

